In theoretical accounts of the neurosciences, investigative research programs have often been separated into the morphological and physiological tradition. The morphological tradition is seen as describing the structure and form of the external and interior parts of the brain and spinal cord. The physiological tradition is interpreted as a compilation of those approaches which investigate cerebral functions particularly in their dynamic interactions. It must be regarded as an open question, though, whether the distinction between the morphological and physiological tradition in modern clinical and basic neuroscience has now become obsolete with the most recent neuroimaging techniques, such as fMRI, PET scans, SPECT, etc. Taken at face value, these new imaging techniques seem to relate, overlap, and even identify the anatomical with the functional substrate, when mapping individual patterns of neural activity across the visually delineated morphological structures. The particular focus of this review article is primarily on the morphological tradition, beginning with German neuroanatomist Samuel Thomas Soemmerring and leading to recent approaches in the neurohistological work of neuroscience centres in the United States and morphophysiological neuroimaging techniques in Canada. Following some landmark research steps in neuroanatomy detailed in the first section, this article analyzes the changing trajectories to an integrative theory of the brain in its second section. An examination of the relationship between form and function within the material culture of neuroscience in the third and nal part, will further reveal an astonishingly heterogeneous investigative and conceptual terrain.
Introduction
A central point of contention in the modern neurosciences regards the speci c contributions that the most recent neuroimaging techniques have made to the study of the relationship between the neuroanatomical sphere of the brain and the psychophysiological sphere of the mind [1] . The subject has emerged as a major discursive topic when viewed from philosophical, historical, as well as cultural perspectives [2] . This article is of a theoretical nature and grew out of prolonged discussions with neuroimagers, clinicians, basic scientists, historians, and philosophers of science [3, 4] , and awareness that corresponding views about [5] .
From such preceding investigations emerged the idea for this article, which aims at aligning and contrasting certain features of the "material culture" [6] of the neurosciences as these emanate from the structure-function dichotomy that has become so central to the language of modern visual representations in this eld [7] . In fact, modern neuroscientific work lacking electron microscopes, highthroughput gene sequencing, or functional magnetic tomography would hardly be possible without the apparatuses and instrumentsthat also embody the conceptual and research assumptions, which the clinical and laboratory workers apply and put to test [8] . It is by no means clear -and needs to be further clari ed in the ongoing neuroscienti c discussionsthat what seems to hold for the physiological approaches on the one side also holds for the morphological approaches on the other side and vice versa -a reciprocal relationship that shall be explored further in this article [9] . With respect to the theory and methodology of the neurosciences, it appears most suitable to explore some of the historical developments in the rst part of the article before critically assessing examples from the status quo in its second part. The third part of the article, in the following, aims at assessing the development of interactions between basic and clinical neuroscience approaches which investigate brain structure, function, and disease. Likewise, an explanation shall be attempted as to how such knowledge is translated into societal applications including new neurological and psychiatric therapies [10] . In this respect, the present article presents itself as an investigation of what happens both in actual neuroscienti c research groups, along with the discussions in the eld of neuroaesthetics [11] .
While pursuing these historical explorations of the material culture of neuroscience, also draws on earlier observations made by the MIT philosopher Hilary Putnam [12] and the Harvard historian of science Peter Galison [13] . As will be argued further below, what appears to be obvious in the case of the physiological tradition (~ "language") likewise holds for the morphological tradition (~ "visual representations") in modern neuroscience [14] . It can be viewed as an open question, however, whether the distinction between the morphological and physiological traditions places the emphasis on either one side of the structural and the functional distinction of the language and representation dichotomy [15] .
Recent public and scienti c discussions over issues of neuromythology and neophrenology thereby invite a reconsideration of the landmark methodologies from a history of neuroscience perspective [16] .
A major incentive for this study of the visual approaches in the history of neuroscience comes from the observation that, at least since the last decades of the 20th century, earlier developments toward an interdisciplinary understanding of neuroscience, the emergence of specialized neuroscienti c imaging centers, and the predominance of international exchanges were becoming central to the modern neuroscienti c enterprise, as is described, for example, in the historical accounts of late Los Angeles neuroscientist Horrace Winchell Magoun (1907 Magoun ( -1991 [17] .
While traditional accounts have often looked at the history of neuroscience from rather regional perspectives, the interest of this article sides with the bigger picture and the astounding developments, which carved out some of the foundations of the emerging eld of "neuroscience, " since its inception in the Neuroscience Research Program of Francis O. Schmitt (1903 Schmitt ( -1995 at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Moreover, some of these early foundations of neuroscience can also be found in histories of neuroscienti c and neuroimaging research [18] . Several such theoretical questions about the formation of interdisciplinary endeavours in the modern neurosciences [19] will make their way into this paper as well, particularly when the intricate relationships between the language of neuroscience and its visual representations are addressed from a historical vantage point. So, again, this is hence not a neuroscience article in the narrow sense of the term, nor is it an attempt to advance a speci c neurophilosophical thesis; rather, it proposes a historically informed perspective on research practice and representational theories in modern neuroscience [20] . I want to side here -for the sake of the argument -with These historical antecedents could give them direction and led to the reiteration of previous answers, which are not actually as revolutionary as we would hope neuroscience's approaches to be [23] .
The approach of the current article is, rst, to venture into several theoretical elds concerning the interrelation of neuroimaging methodologies and research outcomes [24] . Second, I want to take a comparative look at modern developments in the visual representation of structural-functional relationships.
For the sake of the argument, I will not go further back than the 18th century. It is by means of such a broader and deeper exploration of tubes, tapes, and tracks that we can get at a material culture of a discipline" [13] .
This quotation about developments in 20th-century atomic physics could also be transferred to the current neuroscienti c research endeavour, since the interdependence on technology, machines, along with data-and pattern-mining from large-scale data-banks as "experimental archives" has likewise changed the nature of neuroscienti c research activities [28] . representation" [13] .
Admittedly, the neurosciences were never as clearly divided into speci c experimental and theoretical branches, as is the case for physics with its institutional partitioning.
Over long spans of time, nevertheless, shifting advances in the synthesis of brain theory have become discernible in opposing research strategies [31] . Even an overarching term such as "integration" that served for more than a century as a hallmark of brain theory Nevertheless, Descartes' radical differentiation between matter and mind, i.e. between the physical world (res extensa) and the mind (res cogitans), has proven incredibly problematic to overcome, even though most neuroscientists today would probably accept that Cartesian dualism is better understood as a strategy for highlighting problems than to giving answers to them. However, these deliberations belong more to the problem eld of the philosophy of mind [34] .
Similarly, if we take Franz Joseph Gall's 18th-century organology or phrenology theory 
The profusion of data and productivity of brain research do not appear to have solved most of the fundamental neuroscience questions
The multitude of recent successes of the neurosciences have fostered the assumption, among scientists and in the public alike, that an "ultimate breakthrough" would soon be within reach. The riddle of consciousness; the illusion of free will [42] ; the coming together of the relationship of perception, emotion, and cognition [43] ; -the assumption is that these and more conundrums present in many hundreds of years of philosophical and psychological re ection could rapidly come to an end through the enormous progress of empirical research that pushes the envelope of understanding further. This is at least what many active neuroscientists have proclaimed in their recent public accounts [44] . The historian of neuroscience's task, of course, is not so much to question the reliability of the data and evidence that substantiates such claims, but rather to point out historical statements that brain researchers have used to formulate notions about the "breakthroughs" and the "answering" of the above-named questions.
For at least two hundred years, progress in the neurosciences has been so overwhelming that its pioneers felt justified in projecting the experienced rate of progress onto the remaining set of research questions, while concluding that neuroscience would soon reach a perceivable end. With hindsight, it is easy to ridicule such a simplistic view, while it is astounding to look at the continuation and reiteration of such assumptions since the 18th century [45] .
There is, however, a historically more signi cant insight to be gained; namely that the course of events could be taken as evidence for the view that the object of investigation has been transformed in relation to the research that was undertaken -even though it ever was and still is "the same brain" being researched as in the past [46] . Apparently, experimental research into the brain affects its object and makes it more difficult, adding complexity, This understanding is similar to the "embodied strategies of demonstration" in modern physics [13] . The brain's complexity, although conceived of as a "natural quality", is hence likewise an outcome of previous neuroscienti c research,
which is strikingly clear when we read earlier accounts by Samuel Thomas von Soemmerring Along this historical development of increasing complexity of the brain, the solution to the "riddle of consciousness" and to "free will" has, indeed, always been "just around the corner", "just beyond the reach" of present-day instruments and available scienti c data, yet theoretically assumed to be on the horizon. and subsequently used by other scholars in the field, such as Cornelius Borck [71] and Fernando
Vidal [72] . In the medical context, images often described instantaneous and highly intentional perspectives, for example of anatomical preparations, the pathological dissection site, or organs in the preservation glass ( Figure 3 ).
The medical image essentially amounted to a conceptual "freezing in" or a "slowing down" of the biomedical processes at the workbench of pathological laboratories or in the clinic with a patient [73] . of an organ's operations over time [91] .
As a tendency, the new research method of fMRI could rather be characterized by the absence of the "image-and-logic-integration mode", while preference is given to generate images which are functional only "by proxy"
-images that subordinate the language of visual representations to localization [92] .
This claim needs to be further substantiated: clinical neuropathology [96] .
The recent "debate" about fMRI techniques thereby provides a welcome opportunity to reconsider major methodological approaches from the history of the neurosciences with respect to the relative dominance of either structural or functional information provided by them [97] . Sorting the neurosciences according to such forms of information generated also ties together their di erent branches to methodological clusters of instrumentation (here; cutting, slicing, staining, lesioning, stimulating -there; recording, lming, probing, testing, training) [98] (see also Table 1 ).
Certainly, the neurosciences were never as clearly divided into experimental and theoretical areas [99] to the extent that the eld of physics had been. Like research in particle physics, the neurosciences have been very much organized around instrumental practices.
In contrast to physics, however, all branches of the neurosciences rely on one form of visual evidence or another and there is hardly any "anti-visual" strand in brain research today [100] . When following Peter Galison [13] Because of the almost complete absence of a mimetic relation between the visual evidence and captured phenomena, the images from this tradition typically do not reveal or display their content at rst glance [110] . Their information is coded and must hence be extracted, not by looking at them, but through a form of reading.
In this tradition, images are not photographed but written as visual representations in symbolic language.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has not been to convince neuroscientists of the general usefulness of the homomorphic-mimetic classi cation for research in history of neuroscience, but to provide a theoretical bridge to the enterprise of critical neuroscience [111] . It has been argued that the mimetic tradition engages with representational reductionisms because of its intimate connection between visual data and phenomena [112] , whereas the homomorphic tradition is frequently employed by the neuroscienti c community in a physiological mindset, which also includes various branches of non-reductive physicalism [113] . In looking human world in general [117] . Here, much more work is needed in the future.
My argumentation for a critical and
historically informed approach to modern neuroimaging is intended to raise a respect and acknowledgment for interdisciplinary approaches rather than accepting the domination of certain subdisciplines over others [118] . Simply because of the ever-changing nature of neuroscientific knowledge, societies would be poorly advised to seek for an overly rapid "translation" of postulated consequences from neurosienti c research [119] . It may well 
